2. Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies by filing on or about October 15, 1998 a Charge Of Discrimination claim with the CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING (DFEH), which on October 19, 1998 issued the Right-to-Sue Notice required by California Government Code Sections 12900 et seq, and this action is commenced within the one-year required statutory period.

3. Plaintiff was a competent adult and resident of Los Angeles county, California; Plaintiff is an Afro-American; Plaintiff charges that he has suffered severe and continuing injury, emotionally, financially, and professionally as a result of the acts of harm by the hereinbelow named and fictitiously-named Defendants, and each of them, for which acts of harm Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

4. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant CCE was a Delaware corporation, duly authorized to do and doing business in California, more particularly in Los Angeles county, as a manufacturer and/or buyer and/or distributor and/or bottler of syrup for beverages and/or beverages and related products.

5. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant CCE BOTTLING SC was a business organization, form unknown, duly authorized to do and doing business by and in California, as a bottler of COCA-COLA ENTERPRISES syrups for beverages and/or beverages and related products, with its principal office in Los Angeles county at 1334 South Central Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90021 (Defendants' Location).

6. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant CCE WESTERN was a foreign corporation duly authorized to do and doing business in California, more particularly in Los Angeles county, as a manufacturer and/or distributor and/or bottler of syrup for beverages and/or beverages and related products.

7. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant LISTON was a competent adult doing business in California, more particularly in Los Angeles county as the purported owner of Defendant CCE BOTTLING SC.

8. Reference sometimes made in this Complaint to "Defendants CCE, and each of them," encompass Defendants CCE, CCE BOTTLING SC, CCE WESTERN, and LISTON individually, jointly, and/or severally.

9. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant PIMEL was a competent adult, employed in Los Angeles county, California by Defendants CCE, and each of them, as Human Resources Manager by Defendants CCE, and each of them, and acting beyond the course and scope of such managerial authority.

10. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant THYRET was a competent adult, employed in Los Angeles county, California by Defendants CCE, and each of them, as Trade Development Finance Manager and Plaintiff's immediate supervisor, and acting beyond the course and scope of such managerial authority.

11. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant OWENS was a competent adult, employed in Los Angeles county, California by Defendants CCE, and each of them, as Chief Financial Officer of CCE Western Region, by Defendants CCE, and each of them, and acting beyond the course and scope of such managerial authority.

12. Plaintiff upon information and belief alleges Defendant LISA OWENS was a competent adult, employed in Los Angeles county, California in a managerial capacity by Defendants CCE, and each of them, and acting beyond the course and scope of such managerial authority.

13. Plaintiff upon information and belief alleges Defendant NEAL was a competent adult, employed in Los Angeles county, California in a managerial capacity by Defendants CCE, and each of them, and acting beyond the course and scope of such managerial authority.

14. Plaintiff upon information and belief alleges Defendant ZUHLES was a competent adult, employed in Los Angeles County, California and each of them, in a managerial capacity, and acting beyond the course and scope of such managerial authority.

15. Plaintiff upon information and belief alleges Defendant PATEL was a competent adult, employed in Los Angeles County, California and each of them, in a managerial capacity, and acting beyond the course and scope of such managerial authority.

16. Plaintiff sues Defendants DOES 1 to 1000 under California Code Of Civil Procedure Section 474 because their true names and capacities are now unknown but which, when ascertained, will be included by amendment to this Complaint with the Court's leave, as required.

17. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each named and each fictitiously-named Defendant was the agent, employee, or servant of each other remaining Defendant and acted within the course and scope of said agency, employment, or service and with the ratification, affirmation, permission, and consent of each other remaining Defendant.

18. Reference made in this Complaint to "Defendants, and each of them" shall encompass all of the Defendants individually, jointly, and/or severally.

19. Plaintiff has a Masters of Business Administration degree from the University of La Verne, and a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration degree from the University of Redlands, California.

20. Commencing with January 1987 through October 1996, Plaintiff was employed [a] for 3.5 years as an Accounts Manager and as a Hospital Representative by Sandoz Pharmaceuticals where he received one promotion and three salary raises; [b] for 2 years as a Hospital Representative by Johnson & Johnson Laboratories where he received one promotion and one raise, [c] for 1 year and one month where he was a Hospital Representative and Budget and Financial Analyst for the Western United States and Hawaii Region by Knoll Pharmaceuticals where he received one raise, and [d] for 2 years as an Accounts Manager of the Western Region by McKesson Drug Company where he received one raise.

21. Plaintiff, with his educational background in and knowledge of generally accepted accounting principles, financial analysis, marketing, and sales experience, responding to an ad in a local newspaper, applied for the advertised position of Senior Financial Analyst, Grade 14; Defendants CCE, and each of them, hired Plaintiff on or about October 28, 1996 for that original position in which Plaintiff remains to this day.

22. At the time of his hiring on or about October 28, 1996, Plaintiff was told, among other things, that there would be an evaluation of his performance every six months as was the policy of Defendants CCE, and each of them.

23. Among his duties, Plaintiff trained individuals employed by Defendants CCE, and each of them, from Sales individuals to Senior Management individuals in Market Vision displays, an execution tool to track displays within chain Supermarkets, Wholesale Clubs, Pharmacies, and other types of Stores selling the products of Defendants CCE, and each of them.

24. Among his duties, Plaintiff was responsible for the Topline Financial reporting tool used by Senior Management to track, on a daily basis, Case Volume and Total Sales at chain Supermarkets, Wholesale Clubs, Liquor Stores, Pharmacies, and other types of Stores selling the products of Defendants CCE, and each of them.

25. Plaintiff has observed all of the rules and regulations of Defendants CCE, and each of them, and has performed all duties defined in his job definition and more, in that, during and for the period of October 28, 1996 through October 19, 1998:

[a] Plaintiff's execution rate was never lower than 90% to and as high as 98%;

[b] Plaintiff was specifically requested by his superiors to and he did use his knowledge, experience, comprehension, and understanding of his job to and did assist other departments within the company; and

[c] Plaintiff implemented, designed, and published a comprehensive Newsletter, titled, "Market Vision Weekly Update," in which he incorporated words in gray-shaded and black-on-white columns, color graphics and graphs, spread sheets, tables, instructions on "how-to" do and print, and other visual tools, which Newsletter reported weekly marketing results, over and beyond Plaintiff's particular job definition, and which Newsletter was distributed and embraced by Defendants CCE, and each of them, nationwide, and for which Plaintiff received many accolades and requests to continue producing and distributing it.

26. Plaintiff has received no further accolades or requests for his Newsletter from and since the DFEH's issuance of the Right-To-Sue Notice of October 19, 1998.

27. From and since the DFEH's issuance of the October 19, 1998 Right-To-Sue Notice, Plaintiff has been totally excluded from any and all meetings, no oral or written communications have reached Plaintiff's desk, no training sessions have been scheduled for Plaintiff, nor has Plaintiff been given any other job activity, so that Plaintiff has been placed by Defendants, and each of them, in an idle, stagnating, and frustrating condition.

28. From and since commencement of his employment with Defendants CCE, and each of them, Plaintiff has been denied opportunities for promotion as hereinafter set forth.

29. Plaintiff, in an upward mobility effort within his employer's company, has on many occasions as hereinafter set forth requested, applied for, and attempted to obtain other and better positions for which, if one correctly reads the requirements and qualifications of the Defendants CCE, and each of them, Plaintiff has been eminently qualified to apply for; nevertheless, notwithstanding Plaintiff's educational background and business experience, since and from October 28, 1996, Plaintiff has been rejected for just such advancements and denied promotional opportunities by Defendants, and each of them.

30. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that, currently, there are no minority individuals, including but not limited to individuals of African-American descent, at any vice-presidential level within the corporate structure of Defendants CCE, and each of them.

31. Plaintiff, by reference, incorporates herein and makes them a part hereof each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 30 of the Allegations Common to all Causes Of Action as if fully set forth hereat.

32. Despite his educational background, working experience, and competent and innovative handling of his job, Plaintiff has been subjected, since and from about October 28, 1996, to the following acts of harm:

[a] in May 1997, the six-month evaluation that was to occur pursuant to the policy of Defendants CCE, and each of them, did not take place on the excuse that Defendants, and each of them, were extremely business with the business of the day;

[b] in or about October 1997, during a formal meeting between Plaintiff and Defendant THYRET, Plaintiff expressed his desire to become, some day soon, a vice-president of finance of Defendants CCE, and each of them, at which time, Defendant THYRET advised Plaintiff to inform the Human Resources Department Manager, Defendant OWENS, regarding the existence of a "career path" towards Plaintiff's goal;

[c] in or about October 1997, Plaintiff then spoke with Defendant OWENS on the subject of his aspiration to become a Vice-President of Finance, and Plaintiff was informed that Defendants CCE, and each of them, had no such "career path," but that Plaintiff had the "right pedigree to make it to that level;" nevertheless, from that time on, during all further conversations with Plaintiff on the subject of the by-then elusive or non-existent "career path" and Plaintiff's goals, Defendant OWENS and Defendant THYRET acted patronizing and evasive towards Plaintiff;

[d] in November 1997, the six-month evaluation that was to occur pursuant to the policy of Defendants CCE, and each of them, did not take place;

[e] in or about early January 1998, Plaintiff was recommended by Defendants OWENS and THYRET for the job of Principal Financial Analyst; nevertheless, when on January 22, 1998, Plaintiff was interviewed for a supporting position to "one of three Operating Groups in the CCE Account Group," it was done in a slipshod manner by Management members of Defendants CCE, and each of them, who carelessly and inconsistently ignored the typed schedule given beforehand to applicant Plaintiff, clearly appearing to be "going through the motions" without ever intending to advance Plaintiff who, needless to say, received no promotion;

[f] on March 5, 1998, more than one year and four months after Plaintiff was hired by Defendants CCE, and each of them, after receiving accolades, encouragement, and recommendations from Defendants OWENS and THYRET for a transfer to Atlanta, and purportedly for the November 1, 1996 to November 1, 1997 employment period, Plaintiff received a "less-than-satisfactory" evaluation from, among others, Defendant OWENS, claiming "needed improvement" in many phases of his job, with recommendations that if Plaintiff complied with the particular suggestions made in that evaluation, his next one "would be better."

[g] in May 1998, the six-month evaluation that was to to occur pursuant to the policy of Defendants CCE, and each of them, did not take place;

[h] on or about May 19, 1998, Plaintiff submitted a Request For Transfer Form, applying for a Business Process Specialist position, which Request was counter-signed by Plaintiff's supervisor, Defendant THYRET; on or about June 4, 1998, Plaintiff was given a limited interview by Defendant OWENS, who on or about June 19, 1998 denied Plaintiff's Request.

[I] on or about May 26, 1998, Plaintiff queried Defendant THYRET if he knew why Defendant OWENS denied Plaintiff's request for a transfer to Atlanta as Business Process Specialist, Defendant THYRET responded "you can apply to transfer to any position you like, but you will not get it because ... " response ended there without further explanation to Plaintiff;

[j] on August 21, 1998 for the employment period March 5, 1998 to August 21, 1998, even though Plaintiff had thoroughly complied with the suggestions made at the March 5, 1998 evaluation, Plaintiff, once more, received a "less-than-satisfactory" evaluation, again claiming "needed improvement" in many phases of his job and, therefore, Plaintiff was denied promotion to SAP Implementation Manager for which he had applied;

[k] since and from August 21, 1998 there have been no further evaluations of Plaintiff by Defendants, and each of them.

[l] from on or about late May 1998, when Plaintiff let his aspirations of becoming vice-president of finance be known to Defendants, and each of them, where there had previously been the usual formal and informal meetings, friendly banter, idea exchange, lively conversation between Plaintiff and other employees and Defendant THYRET, there was now a marked, growing exclusion of Plaintiff in all such conversation or exchange of ideas or everyday, friendly banter.

[m] from and since the issuance of the Right-To-Sue Notice on October 19, 1998, Plaintiff's routine has been reduced to his coming in at 8:00 AM, taking but a few and far-between telephone calls, leaving at 4:30 PM without having participated in any formal or informal meetings from which he is totally excluded'

[n] other than the civilities from some co-workers at his every working day arrival and departure from Defendants' Location, Plaintiff has been ostracized and, in the most demeaning and humiliating manner, has been kept from any and all job activities to the present date from and since October 19, 1998, to wit, October 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 1998; November 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 30, 1998; December 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 21, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 1998; January 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 1999; February 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 1999; March 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 1999; April 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 1999.

33. Plaintiff on information and belief alleges that there are no Afro-American minorities within the management hierarchy of Defendants, and each of them.

34. Despite Plaintiff's, among other aptitudes and skills, educational background with a Masters and a Bachelor degrees, past employment experience including generally-accepted accounting principles presentation skills, and command of the English language, on information and belief Plaintiff alleges he has been denied promotional opportunities because Defendants, and each of them, within the corporate structure of Defendants, and each of them, where transfers, promotions, advancements, and higher wages are concerned:

[a] favor less-qualified, non-minority applicants;

[b] have a pattern and practice of advancing non-minority candidates over minority candidates including, among other things, changing job specifications and/or qualifications and/or requirements and accepting such non-minority individuals with lesser or no college degrees and/or lesser business-requirements experience;

[c] rendering "unsatisfactory" or "less-than-satisfactory" evaluations, thus maximizing their personal discretion and give effect to biases in promotional decisions;

[d] engaging in retaliatory acts against Plaintiff because of the complaint he filed with the DFEH and the subsequent DFEH's Right-To-Sue Notice.

35. In March 1998, the "less-than-satisfactory" evaluation Plaintiff received was prepared by Defendant THYRET and approved by Defendant OWENS, both of whom, curiously enough, had recommended Plaintiff for promotion in January 1998.

36. Although directed to carry out a continuous training program, as hereinabove set forth, and even while carrying out said training program, Defendants, and each of them, insisted on giving Plaintiff the "less-than-satisfactory" evaluations, which indicated that the very things Plaintiff was successfully doing, were not.

37. Due to the racially discriminatory treatment of Plaintiff, which Defendants, and each of them, have failed to correct, Plaintiff has also been subjected to a discriminatory work environment.

38. Such behavior of Defendants, and each of them, constitutes race discrimination and retaliation for the charges of discrimination in promotional brought by Plaintiff, all in violation of the California Fair Employment And Housing Act, California Government Code Section 12940.

39. As a direct and proximate result of the hereinabove-described acts and omissions of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has been denied promotional opportunities and has thereby incurred losses in wage increments therefor, all to Plaintiff's damage in amounts as shall be established upon proof at Trial together with prejudgment interest pursuant to California Civil Code Section 3287, 3288, and/or 3291.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
INTENTIONAL AND NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

41. As a further direct and proximate result of such acts and omissions of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress, humiliation, and mental anguish, all to Plaintiff's damage in amounts as shall be established upon proof at Trial, together with prejudgment interest pursuant to California Civil Code Sections 3288, 3291, and/or any other applicable provision providing for prejudgment interest.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST DEFENDANTS PIMEL, OWENS, THYRET, LISA OWENS,
NEAL, ZUHLES, AND PATEL, AND EACH OF THEM,
FOR INTENTIONAL AND NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS - PUNITIVE DAMAGES

42. Plaintiff, by reference, incorporates herein and makes them a part hereof, each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 31 to 38 of the First Cause Of Action, and Paragraph 40 of the Second Cause Of Action as if fully set forth hereat.

43. In doing the things herein alleged, Defendants PIMEL, THYRET, OWENS, LISA OWENS, NEAL, ZUHLES, and PATEL, and each of them, acted fraudulently, maliciously, and oppressively. By reason thereof, Plaintiff is entitled to claim punitive damages to punish and make an example of Defendants, and each of them, in an amount to be established by proof at Trial. Plaintiff claims such amount as damages, together with prejudgment interest pursuant to California Civil Code Sections 3288, 3291, and/or any other applicable provision providing for prejudgment interest.

44. Pursuant to California Government Code Section 12965(b), Plaintiff requests an award of attorney's fees.


WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for Judgment against Defendants, and each of them, as it applies to each of Plaintiff's causes of action, for:

1) General damages as shall be established by proof at time of Trial;

2) damages based upon lost income in such amounts as shall be established by proof at time of Trial;

3) damages based upon severe emotional distress in such amounts as shall be established by proof at time of Trial;

4) punitive damages in such amounts as shall be established by proof at time of Trial;

5) pre-Judgment interest;

6) attorney's fees according to proof;

7) costs of suit herein incurred; and for

8) such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.


DATED on April 30, 1999 at Los Angeles, California.
The Marina Law Center
Attorneys for Robert Molett, Plaintiff